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ABSTRACT 
SUBCRITICALITY ANALYSIS OF HTR-10 SPENT FUEL CASK MODEL FOR THE 10 MW 
HTR INDONESIAN EXPERIMENTAL POWER REACTOR. The 10 MW HTR Indonesian 
Experimental Power Reactor (RDE reactor) is designed identical with the HTR-10 in China, conceptually.  
However, the review results showed that the spent fuel cask model which is used between two reactors is 
fully different, such as size and capacity. The proposed cask model in RDE reactor can hold 15 times 
more fuel pebbles than HTR-10 has.  This research activities deal with the subcriticality analysis for the 
spent fuel cask of RDE reactor if using the HTR-10 cask model.  The subcriticality condition is designed 
to meet the limit of safety value.  The objective of this research is to determine the subcriticality value in 
the normal and accident events for the spent fuel cask when it is in the reactor building and the spent fuel 
cask room.  All calculations were carried out by MCNP6.1 code.  The selected external events are the 
water ingress (reactor room), water flood and the combination event of water flood and earthquake.  The 
calculation results showed that the maximum value of keff (3σ) are  0.47510 and 0.19214 for the cask in 
the reactor building and in the spent fuel cask room, respectively.  This value is far from the limit value of 
0.95. The calculation results showed that the spent fuel cask are in the safe condition eventhough in the 
worst combination events, the cask is flooded and earthquake. The HTR-10 spent fuel cask can be 
proposed as an alternative for the RDE reactor to get an efficient reactor building. 
 
Keywords: spent pebble fuel element, HTGR, subcriticality, MCNP6.1, RDE reactor 
ABSTRAK 
ANALISIS SUBKRITIKALITAS PENYIMPAN BAHAN BAKAR BEKAS MODEL CASK REAKTOR 
HTR-10 UNTUK REAKTOR DAYA EKSPERIMENTAL 10 MW TERMAL. Reaktor Daya 
Eksperimental (RDE) secara konseptual didesain identik dengan reaktor HTR-10 di Tiongkok.  Meskipun 
demikian, terdapat perbedaan yang signifikan untuk desain konseptual cask penyimpan bahan bakar 
bekas di kedua reaktor seperti dimensi dan kapasitas.  Kegiatan penelitian ini berkaitan dengan analisis 
subkritikalitas cask penyimpan elemen bahan bakar bekas tipe pebble di RDE jika menggunakan model 
cask yang dipakai di HTR-10. Kondisi sub-kritikalitas didesain memenuhi nilai batas keselamatan. 
Tujuan penelitian adalah menentukan nilai subkritikalitas dalam keadaan normal atau kondisi 
kecelakaan di gedung reaktor dan di gudang penyimpan bahan bakar bekas.  Perhitungan dilakukan 
dengan paket program MCNP6.1. Kejadian kecelakaan yang dipilih adalah masuknya air ke dalam cask, 
cask terendam air dan kombinasi cask terendam air dan kejadian gempa. Hasil perhitungan 
menunjukkan bahwa nilai maksimum keff (3σ) untuk cask di gedung reaktor dan di gudang penyimpan 
bahan bakar bekas masing-masing adalah 0,47510 dan 0,19214.  Nilai ini masih jauh dari batas 0,95.  
Hasil perhitungan menunjukkan bahwa cask penyimpan bahan bakar bekas tetap dalam keadaan selamat 
meski terjadi kombinasi 2 kejadian eksternal. 
 
Kata kunci: elemen bahan bakar bekas tipe pebble, HTGR, subkritikalitas, MCNP6.1, RDE 
 
 
_______________________________ 
DOI: 10.17146/tdm.2018.20.3.4630 
J. Tek. Reaktor. Nukl.  
Vol. 20 No. 3 Oktober 2018, Hal. 151-158 
P-ISSN: 1411–240X E-ISSN: 2527-9963 
Nomor Akreditasi: 21/E/KPT/2018 
(Masa Berlaku s/d Vol. 22 No. 3 Tahun 2020) 
 
152  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Construction of the 10 MW HTR Indonesian Experimental Power Reactor, named Reaktor 
Daya Experimental (RDE) is a priority program of BATAN to be used as a R&D facility nuclear 
energy, besides to get a high public acceptance for the first nuclear power plant in Indonesia [1,2].  
RDE reactor is a 10 MW (thermal) High Temperature Gas-cooled Reactor (HTGR) using TRISO 
pebble bed fuel element [3]. The power of 10 MW is generated by 27,000 fuel pebbles with the 
multi-pass fuel loading scheme.  25 fresh fuel pebbles are loaded with each fuel pebble will pass 
through the reactor core five times  (in average) before it will be discharged to the spent fuel cask.  
It means, 25 fuel pebbles are sent to the cask per day or 9,000 fuel pebbles per year [3]. By this 
specification, RDE is identic with the HTR-10 reactor in China [4-6]. 
The conceptual design document of RDE show the size of spent fuel cask proposed by 
RENUKO is different from that used in the HTR-10 [3,7]. The main difference is capacity, the 
submitted design is 30,000 fuel pebbles but the HTR-10 cask is 2,000 fuel pebbles. The difference 
has an impact on the area that has to be provided in the reactor building and spent fuel storage 
room.  The crane and transportations system should be fixed with the cask size.  RENUKO decided 
to adopt the cask for fulfilling the requirement of resistance from the external hazard of the aircraft 
crash. 
The spent fuel cask with smaller volume will reduce the area and the cask handling is more 
efficient. The idea to apply the HTR-10 cask in the RDE is needed to be carried out.  The objective 
of this research is to analyze the subcriticality of the cask in the reactor building and the spent fuel 
storage room (SFSR) with normal and accident conditions.  The influence on the SFSR will be 
discussed. 
The results of this study are useful for the basic and detail design of RDE, specifically for the 
spent fuel management/handling system, the reactor layout and the SFSR. The study was 
conducted by using the MCNP6.1 code with the ENDF/B-VII.1 nuclear library [8–10]. This code 
has been verified and validated with various cases and types of reactors that showed the satisfactory 
results [11, 12]. The criticality conditions were carried out for 3 accident conditions, i.e. water 
ingress (cask), the cask is flooded and the combination of water flood and earthquake. 
DESCRIPTION OF RDE AND HTR-10 SPENT FUEL CASKS 
The spent fuel cask (SFC) of RDE is designed conceptually based on the PWR spent fuel 
cask technology [3]. The SFC is designed resistance with the external event of aircraft crashes. The 
SPF is able to store an average of 30,000 fuel pebbles with the length and outer diameter of 7,000 
mm and 2,500 mm [3], respectively. The time required for the SFC to be full of fuel pebbles is 
1,200 effective full power days (EFPD). With this size, the SFC can accommodate the maximum 
number of 45,000 fuel pebbles [3]. When the SFC is full, then transferred to the SFSR located 
outside the reactor building.  The detail information of the HTR-10 spent fuel cask can be seen in 
[7].  Table 1 shows the comparison between the RDE and HTR-10 spent fuel casks. 
Table 1. Dimension and material for the RDE and HTR-10 spent fuel casks [3, 7]. 
Parameters 
Values 
Designed RDE cask HTR-10 cask 
Total height, m 7 2.1 
Outer diameter, m 2.5 0.878 
Inner diamater,m - 0.606 
Average capacity, pebble 30,000 2,000 
Main material Modular cast iron (GGG 40.3) Modular cast iron (GGG 40.3) 
Shielding Thick steel mixed with boron Thick steel with lead 
 
The different cask dimensions caused the specification of the SFSR is different, too. The 
specification can be shown in the Table 2. The SFSR should be able to accommodate the 40 years 
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operation of RDE, then a total of 16 and 200 casks are needed for RDE and HTR-10 reactors, 
respectively. As a result, the space needed for the RDE reactor is 300 m2 while the HTR-10 
requires an area of 400 m2. However, the minimum height required for RDE is 7 m and for HTR-10 
is 2.1 m. 
Table 2. Comparison spent fuel storage room for RDE and HTR-10 [3, 7]. 
Parameters Value Concpetual design of RDE HTR-10 
Coolant Natural and force convection Natural and force convection 
Shielding concrete concrete 
Inner/Outer diameter of shielding, m - 1/1.3 
Height of shielding,m - 1.8 
Capacity, casks 16 204 
Surface temperatur of cask, oC 80 60 
Heat per cask, kW 19 1.9 
Number of cask for 40 years 
operation 
16 200 
Area, m × m 12 × 25 20 × 20  
METHODOLOGY 
All subcriticality calculations were carried out using the MCNP6.1 code, all program 
packages. The fuel kernels with TRISO coated particles and pebble fuel elements are modeled with 
detailed 3-dimensional geometry.  The spent fuel cask is modeled based on the following 
conditions: 
a.   Dimensions of cask: 
1.  If we assumed the packing fraction of pebbles in the cask is 0.61, the volume of 1 fuel 
pebble is 185.4055 cm3 
2. The capacity cask is 2,000 pebbles, so the inner volume of the cask is 370,810.9 cm3 
3. We assumed that the bottom or upper part of the cask is ½ sphere 
4. Inner radius cask is 30.3 cm, so the area of the cask is 116,5243.3 cm3 
5. The volume of bottom or upper part is 4/3×π×(30,3 cm)3 = 116.524,3 cm3 
6. The volume of cylinder part is  370,810.9 cm3 -  116,524.3 cm3 = 254,286.6 cm3 
7. The height of cylinder part is 254,286.6 cm3 / 2,884.265 cm2 = 88.16342 cm  
b.  Thickness of Pb (lead) 
Ref [7] showed that cask is placed between two layers of stainless steel (SS). The thickness 
of Pb depends on the thickness of SS. SS material used is modular cast iron (GGG 40.3) 
with a composition of 3.70 w / o C, 2.50 w / o Si, 0.4 Mn, and the rest is Fe. Total 
thickness of the cask is 13.6 cm [7] so that, if divided by 3, the thickness is 13.6 cm / 3 or 
4,5333 cm, so it is assumed that the minimum Pb thickness is 4,5333 cm. Then, the 
thickness of SS inside is varied up to 0.5 cm or identical making thick Pb increase until it 
reaches a maximum thickness of 8.5667 cm. Therefore, the effect of Pb thickness on the 
criticality calculations is carried out. Table 3 shows the variation of Pb thickness used in 
this study. 
Table 3. Variasi tebal Pb cask penyimpan EBBB. 
 Outer thickness of SS, 
cm 
Thickness of Pb, 
cm 
Inner thickness of SS, 
cm 
Thickness-1 4.5333 4.5333 4.5333 
Thickness-2 4.5333 5.0333 4.0333 
Thickness-3 4.5333 5.5667 3.5 
Thickness-4 4.5333 6.0667 3.0 
Thickness-5 4.5333 6.5667 2.5 
Thickness-6 4.5333 7.0667 2.0 
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 Outer thickness of SS, 
cm 
Thickness of Pb, 
cm 
Inner thickness of SS, 
cm 
Thickness-7 4.5333 7.5667 1.5 
Thickness-8 4.5333 8.0667 1.0 
Thickness-9 4.5333 8.5667 0.5 
 
The kernel particles are modeled by simple cubic (SC) while the fuel pebble is model by the 
body-centered cubic (BCC).  Table 4 shows the input parameter for the MCNP calculations. The 
calculations were carried out for 9 thickness of Pb (Table 3). All nuclides were taken from the 
ENDF/B-VII.1 file (zaid .80c) [9].  The thermal scattering treatments are from graphite (grph) and 
graphite and water (lwtr) for normal and accident conditions, respectively.  The floor with the 
thickness of 30 cm is chosen for this calculation. 
Table 4. MCNP input for cariticality calculation. 
Parameters Criticality Calculation 
Reactor Building Spent Fuel Storage Facility 
Neuton per cycle 10000 10000 
Total cycles 400 400 
Skipped cycle 100 100 
Neutron source card ksrc ksrc 
Calculation mode n n 
S(α,β) grph and lwtr grph and lwtr 
 
Criticality analysis is carried out for normal and accident conditions. The conservative 
criticality values are chosen to assume the fresh fuel (fuel burn-up is 0%) are in the cask. Table 5 
shows 3 selected accident conditions with one event which is a combination of two events. The first 
accident is water ingress.  The water ingress in the cask occurred if the isolation valve is not 
working when the water ingress occurred in the core. We assumed that there is no water ingress in 
the SFSR.  The second accident of water flood occurred in the reactor building and SFSR. The third 
accident is the combination of 2 events of water flood and earthquake.  The combination event is 
assumed to occur in both of reactor building and SFSR. Criticality value, keff, for all conditions 
must be less than 0.95 with a standard deviation of 3σ. We assumed that the higher fuel compaction 
of 21.3% resulted when the earthquake event.  
Table 5. Selected events for criticality analysis of spent fuel cask. 
Postulated events Criticality Calculation 
Reactor building Spent fuel storage facility 
Water ingress Yes No 
Water flood Yes Yes 
Water flood and earthquake Yes Yes 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
MCNP model of cask 
As mentioned earlier, the number of the cask in the reactor building and the SFSR are 1 cask 
and 200 casks (10 × 20 cask) respectively. Figures 1 and 2 show the detail MCNP model for the 
cask in the reactor building and the SFSR.  Figure 1 shows the MCNP model has conformity with 
the technical drawing of the cask.  The configuration of 200 casks, 10 × 20, is also successfully 
modeled as shown in Fig. 2, of the detailed MCNP6.1 modeling that is in accordance with the 
original image. Figure 1 also shows that cask filled by 2,000 fresh pebble fuel elements. Figure 2 
shows the configuration of 200 casks, 10 × 20, also successfully modeled in detail with MCNP. 
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Figure 1. Technical drawing (a) [5] MCNP model (b) of cask. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 2. The cask configuration in the SFSR, vertical view (a) and horizontal view (b). 
Criticality analysis in the reactor building  
The criticality calculation results of cask in the reactor building for normal and 3 postulated 
accident events are shown in Table 6. The calculation results show that the keff will increase with the 
increment of Pb thickness, for all conditions. The keff increased by 16%, 1.6%, 1.6% and 2.4% for 
normal condition, water ingress, water flood and the combination of the water flood and 
earthquake. This is due to the thickness of inner SS is thinner if the Pb is thicker, so the neutron 
absorption rate of Fe in SS decreased. The calculation results prove that the keff increase sensitively 
in the normal conditions. 
Table 6 also shows that the criticality for the water ingress has a higher effect than the water 
flood.  This can be seen from the calculated keff is higher than 0.6%, although 0.6% difference is 
significant because it is larger than 3σ. The combination event, water flood and earthquake, is the 
postulated event that gives a highest increment of keff among those postulated events. This is 
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indicated by the difference of 20% for keff of the each event compare with the water ingress event. It 
should be noted that if the maximum value of 3σ is taken, the keff value will increase by 191%, 
189% and 251% respectively for the water ingress, water flood and the combination event,  
compared with the average keff of normal condition. 
The maximum calculated keff is 0.4746 (3σ) but this value is still far from the limit value of 
0.95. When compared with the normal conditions, the value is up 2.5 times, which indicates that 
the selected combination event is significant enough to increase the criticality condition of the cask. 
The calculation results also show that the fuel compaction from the earthquake gives a maximum 
contribution on the keff only 0.08495.  Therefore, the contribution of water, water ingress or water 
flood, which contributes considerably in the criticality of the cask. 
Table 6. Calculated keff for cask in reactor building with normal and 3 postulated events. 
 Thickness of 
Pb, cm 
keff deviation (3σ) 
Normal condition 
Thickness-1 4.5333 0.11658 0.00041 
Thickness-2 5.0333 0.11702 0.00043 
Thickness-3 5.5667 0.11771 0.00045 
Thickness-4 6.0667 0.11812 0.00044 
Thickness-5 6.5667 0.12005 0.00044 
Thickness-6 7.0667 0.12143 0.00040 
Thickness-7 7.5667 0.12364 0.00043 
Thickness-8 8.0667 0.12799 0.00049 
Thickness-9 8.5667 0.13523 0.00046 
Postulated event- 1: water ingress 
Thickness-1 4.5333 0.38646 0.00050 
Thickness-2 5.0333 0.38639 0.00052 
Thickness-3 5.5667 0.38648 0.00048 
Thickness-4 6.0667 0.38675 0.00045 
Thickness-5 6.5667 0.38672 0.00050 
Thickness-6 7.0667 0.38754 0.00052 
Thickness-7 7.5667 0.38796 0.00048 
Thickness-8 8.0667 0.38986 0.00052 
Thickness-9 8.5667 0.39248 0.00050 
Postulated event-2: water flood 
Thickness-1 4.5333 0.38405 0.00049 
Thickness-2 5.0333 0.38390 0.00049 
Thickness-3 5.5667 0.38419 0.00047 
Thickness-4 6.0667 0.38427 0.00052 
Thickness-5 6.5667 0.38426 0.00048 
Thickness-6 7.0667 0.38489 0.00049 
Thickness-7 7.5667 0.38584 0.00049 
Thickness-8 8.0667 0.38727 0.00051 
Thickness-9 8.5667 0.39013 0.00048 
Postulated event-3: water flood and earthquake 
Thickness-1 4.5333 0.46251 0.00114 
Thickness-2 5.0333 0.46345 0.00105 
Thickness-3 5.5667 0.46332 0.00120 
Thickness-4 6.0667 0.46371 0.00133 
Thickness-5 6.5667 0.46354 0.00167 
Thickness-6 7.0667 0.46409 0.00112 
Thickness-7 7.5667 0.46637 0.00085 
Thickness-8 8.0667 0.46821 0.00137 
Thickness-9 8.5667 0.47338 0.00122 
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Criticality analysis in the SFSR 
Table 7 shows the keff of cask in the SFSR for normal and 2 postulated events.  Unlike in the 
reactor building, the water ingress event is not taken into account because all the casks are closed.  
The calculation results in Table 7 show the same trend as the calculation results in the reactor 
building that the keff of cask will increase with the thicker. Table 7 showed the keff increased into 
14.6%. 11.5% and 10.3% for the normal conditions, the water flood and the combination of 2 
events, respectively.  Although the increment of keff is smaller than in the reactor building for the 
normal conditions, however on the contrary it is greater for the combination of 2 events.  The 
contribution of concrete shielding and moderator ratio around the cask influences the criticality of 
the cask.   
Table 7. Calculated criticality of cask in SFSR. 
 Thickness of 
Pb, cm 
keff deviation (3σ) 
Normal condition 
Thickness-1 4.5333 0.12472 0.00043 
Thickness-9 8.5667 0.14293 0.00046 
Postulated event-2: water flood 
Thickness-1 4.5333 0.10806 0.00039 
Thickness-9 8.5667 0.12044 0.00047 
Postulated event-3: water flood and earthquake 
Thickness-1 4.5333 0.17233 0.00188 
Thickness-9 8.5667 0.19016 0.00198 
 
Table 7 also shows that the calculated keff decreased for the water flood event compared to 
the normal conditions in the range of 13.4% - 15.7%. This is contrast with what occurred in the 
reactor building because the cask configuration made the over-moderated condition so that when 
the water is more, it will decrease the keff. However, for the combination of 2 events, the calculated 
keff is higher than normal conditions in the range of 33% - 38.2%. The contribution of the fuel 
compaction to the keff is more than 57.9% - 59.5%. This shows the effect of the earthquake 
significantly influences the criticality in the SFSR.  The maximum keff of the cask is 0.19214 (3σ) 
for the combination of 2 events, but this value is far from the limit value of 0.95. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The calculation results of MCNP6.1 code show that subcriticality of spent fuel cask can be 
maintained even in the combination 2 postulated accident events, water flood and earthquakes. The 
maximum sub-criticalities for the casks (3σ) are 0.47510 and 0.19214 in the reactor building and 
the spent fuel storage room (SFSR), respectively. Those values are below the limit value of 0.95.  
The cask of HTR-10 reactor can be applied in the RDE considering the reactor core and the fuel 
specification used are the same as the HTR-10 reactor. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
The authors would like to thank Mr. Zuhair (PTKRN-BATAN) for his helpful advice on the 
modeling the kernel particles and fuel pebbles.  This research work is the part of RDE project in the 
PKSEN-BATAN and PTLR-BATAN funded by the DIPA 2018. 
 
J. Tek. Reaktor. Nukl.  
Vol. 20 No. 3 Oktober 2018, Hal. 151-158 
P-ISSN: 1411–240X E-ISSN: 2527-9963 
Nomor Akreditasi: 21/E/KPT/2018 
(Masa Berlaku s/d Vol. 22 No. 3 Tahun 2020) 
 
158  
 
REFERENCES 
1.  Liem P.H.. Sembiring T.M.. Arbie B.. Subki I. Analysis of the optimal fuel composition for 
the Indonesian experimental power reactor. Kerntechnik. 2017. 82(1):78-86 
2.  Husnayani I.. Udiyani P.M. Radionuclide characteristics of RDE spent fuels. Tri Dasa 
Mega. 2018. 22(3):69–76. 
3.  RENUKO Fuel Handling and Storage - Conceptual Design. RDE/DS-WBS02-210. Jakarta: 
2015. 
4. Wu Z..  Lin D.. Zhong D. The design features of HTR-10. Nuclear Engineering and Design. 
2002. 218:25-32 
5. Liem P.H. Sembiring T.M.. Tran H.N. Evaluation on fuel cycle and loading scheme of the 
Indonesian experimental power reactor (RDE) design.  Nuclear Engineering and Design. 
2018. 340:245-259 
6. Liem P.H.. Tran H.N.. Sembiring T.M.. Arbie B.. Subki I. Alternative Fueling Scheme for 
the Indonesian Experimental Power Reactor (10 MWth Pebble-Bed HTGR). Energy 
Procedia. 2017. 131:69–76 
7. Wang J.H.. Huang Y.F.. Tang Y.. Wu B. Natural safety analysis of the spent fuel residual 
heat removal in loading and storage process of HTR-10. Energy Procedia. 2013. 39:227–39 
8.  Goorley T.. James M.. Booth T.. Brown F.. Bull J.. Cox L.J.. et al. Features of MCNP6. 
Ann. Nucl. Energy. 2016. 87:772–83. 
9.  Marck S.C. Van Der Benchmarking ENDF/B-VII.1. JENDL-4.0 and JEFF-3.1.1 with 
MCNP6. Nucl. Data Sheets. 2012. 113(12):2935–3005. 
10.  Kahler A.C.. MacFarlane R.E.. Chadwick M.B. Integral data testing of ENDF/B-VII.1 files 
- success stories and need to improve stories. Nucl. Data Sheets. 2014. 118(1):410–3. 
11.  Abrefah R.G.. Birikorang S.A.. Nyarko B.J.B.. Fletcher J.J.. Akaho E.H.K. Design of 
serpentine cask for Ghana research reactor-1 spent nuclear fuel. Prog. Nucl. Energy. 2014. 
77:84–91. 
12.  Artiani P.A.. Heriyanto K. Analisis sub-kritikalitas rak bahan bakar nuklir bekas RSG-GAS 
menggunakan aluminium. Urania 2017. 23(2):127–38. 
  
 
